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CONSTITUTIONAL REFORMS TO ENHANCE DEMOCRATIC
PARTICIPATION AND DELIBERATION: NOT ALL CLEARLY
TRIGGER THE ARTICLE V AMENDMENT PROCESS
CAROL NACKENOFF*
Scholars who point to ways in which the United States Constitu-
tion changes over time through processes of informal amendment, in
which the Supreme Court is but one player, cannot seriously mean to
suggest that all constitutional problems can be solved informally.
Their understanding of legitimate transformation is, to be sure, more
complex and interesting than that of the strict Article V proponents.
For conservatives such as Justice Scalia and Robert Bork, there is “the
whole antievolutionary purpose of a constitution,” i.e., the Constitu-
tion is not a more democratic one than the Framers chose to give us.1
By this line of argument, if we want to make the Constitution more
democratic, we should amend it using Article V provisions,2 and not
try to achieve through judicial activism what cannot be won through
the political process.  Most contemporary legal scholars acknowledge
and can live with the fact that there are many ways in which constitu-
tional arrangements change or are constructed over time by interac-
tion between branches and political actors.3  Sometimes problems,
silences, and indeterminacies in the Constitution are resolved in this
way, as those actors beyond the confines of the Supreme Court partici-
pate in working out general directions and reworking the meaning of
Copyright  2007 by Carol Nackenoff.
* Richter Professor of Political Science at Swarthmore College; professor of constitu-
tional law, American politics, and environmental policy.  Author of The Fictional Republic
(Oxford, 1994), and currently working on a manuscript exploring the contested meaning
of citizenship in the Progressive Era.  I would like to thank Maria Macia and Caitlin Marko-
witz, Swarthmore class of 2007, for invaluable research assistance.
1. ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 44 (1997). See generally ROBERT
BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA (1990).
2. U.S. CONST. art. V.
3. See KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION 1 (1999) (stating that
beyond traditional and interpretive instruments, meaning in the Constitution “must be
construed from the political melding of the document with external interests and princi-
ples”).  Whittington would, however, restrict the role of the Court to interpretation and
not construction. Id. at 209–10.  Other scholars are far more comfortable with including
the Court in this process of construction. See generally THE SUPREME COURT AND AMERICAN
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT (Ronald Kahn & Ken I. Kersch eds., 2006) (containing a series of
essays that address the roles played by courts, other institutions, and activists in constitu-
tional development).
62
\\server05\productn\M\MLR\67-1\MLR107.txt unknown Seq: 2 14-DEC-07 12:33
2007] CONSTITUTIONAL REFORMS 63
the text.4  The Court performs as one institutional actor in this
process.
John Hart Ely won legions of devotees by arguing that the Consti-
tution gave the Court power to intervene, in the name of enhancing
democracy, when the political process deliberately and systematically
excluded discrete and insular minorities, rendered their voice ineffec-
tive, and made it impossible for them to resolve their grievances
there.5  Constitutional authorization for such intervention came from
what Ely saw as the overarching constitutional commitment to the
democratic process.6  Even if Ely is correct that the Constitution
makes this textual commitment to democracy, not all constitutional
problems are this tractable.  Some democracy-denying aspects of the
Constitution don’t have a fix in the judicial branch or through other
processes of construction: there are simply roadblocks.7
In Our Undemocratic Constitution, Sanford Levinson challenged
Americans to propose a constitutional convention to make America
more democratic by fixing some of these roadblocks.8  This Essay will
join the call, focusing on a few specific problems and considering why
they should be remedied.  Notwithstanding this Essay’s discussion of
the advantages of changing current arrangements, this author is less
optimistic than Levinson that a constitutional convention, if called,
would alter the Constitution in ways that would be personally appeal-
ing.  There will always remain those invested in current arrangements
who will not want change.  Additionally, political scientists recognize
that fear of discrete or tangible loss helps mobilize constituencies far
more effectively than hope of a less tangible gain,9 and that people
4. Carol Nackenoff, Constitutionalizing Terms of Inclusion: Friends of the Indian and Citi-
zenship for Native Americans, 1880s–1930s, in THE SUPREME COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICAL
DEVELOPMENT, supra note 33, at 399–403. R
5. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 135–36 (1980) (arguing that judicial
review is properly exercised to protect the rights of minorities against failures of the politi-
cal process).
6. Id. at 5–7.
7. As Sanford Levinson and Robert Dahl point out, the fact that small and large states
have equal representation in the U.S. Senate is one such intractable problem. SANFORD
LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION 49–62 (2006); ROBERT A. DAHL, HOW DEMO-
CRATIC IS THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION? 17–18, 144–45 (2002).
8. LEVINSON, supra note 7, at 173–75.
9. See R. Kent Weaver, The Politics of Blame Avoidance, 6 J. PUB. POL’Y 371, 373–74,
394–95 (1987) (arguing that policy makers have a strong blame-avoidance incentive be-
cause voters are more sensitive to “what has been done to them then to what has been done
for them”).
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more easily organize around discrete interests than generalized
ones.10
It is conceivable that such a convention would propose to make
abortion or gay marriage unconstitutional (though the former would
likely fail ratification), or prevent the federal government from pass-
ing along unfunded mandates to the states, or eliminate a pre-
Rehnquist Court understanding of the “wall” of separation between
church and state so that prayer can once again find its way into public
schools and religion regain its “rightful” place in American life, or
require that any regulation that negatively impacts the value of private
property constitute a “taking” mandating compensation, or dramati-
cally curtail the power of the Court or curb its jurisdiction over partic-
ular types of cases, or require that the federal government balance the
budget each year (many state constitutions have such requirements,
and these take great creativity to circumvent).  Given the interests that
have worked hard to mobilize at the local, state, and national level
over the past quarter century,11 conservatives and libertarians surely
have plenty of ideas to try out.  Democrats may have won an important
victory in the midterm election of 2006, but they should not mistake
this for the kind of infrastructure more conservative elements have
put in place around the country.12  What might result from a constitu-
tional convention could be frightening for liberals.
Nevertheless, let me step up to the plate as a political scientist to
propose a few constitutional reforms that I think would greatly en-
hance the quality of democratic deliberation and political participa-
tion in America.  Surprisingly, perhaps, a couple of these would not
10. See MANCUR OLSON, JR., THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION 2 (1965) (arguing that,
in most cases, rational self-interested individuals will not act in large groups to achieve
broad social goods, even to achieve commonly beneficial goals); JAMES Q. WILSON, POLITI-
CAL ORGANIZATIONS 20–22 (1973) (applying the collective action problem to political
organizing).
11. These include Christian conservatives who have become a key force in state Repub-
lican parties, sagebrush rebellion activists, and property rights advocates. E.g., CLYDE WIL-
COX & CARIN LARSON, ONWARD CHRISTIAN SOLDIERS? (3d ed. 2006) (detailing the evolution
of the Christian Right in America); R. MCGREGGOR CAWLEY, FEDERAL LAND, WESTERN AN-
GER: THE SAGEBRUSH REBELLION AND ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS (1993) (discussing the con-
frontational response of conservatives to federal land management decisions); RICHARD
EPSTEIN, TAKINGS (1985) (addressing private property and the power of eminent domain).
12. See MATTHEW MOEN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE CHRISTIAN RIGHT (1992) (chron-
icling the evolution of the Christian Right); Duane M. Oldfield, The Christian Right in the
Presidential Nominating Process, in IN PURSUIT OF THE WHITE HOUSE 254, 255 (William G.
Mayer ed., 1996) (exploring the significant role and influence of the Christian Right);
Mark J. Rozell & Clyde Wilcox, Second Coming: The Strategies of the New Christian Right, 111
POL. SCI. Q. 271, 279–87 (1996) (examining how the Christian Right became formidable
political activists). See also supra note 11 and accompanying text.
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seem to require constitutional amendments.  Current arrangements,
however, are so integrated in the fabric and tradition of our political
system (like political parties) that any change might warrant using the
amendment process.
Both Sanford Levinson and Robert Dahl have written so effec-
tively in recent years about the overrepresentation of small states in
the Senate13 that I will not belabor this reform.  This Essay will instead
concentrate on the following reforms:
• Mandating that Court decisions require two-thirds of the voting
members in the majority;
• Eliminating the Electoral College;
• Guaranteeing that individual citizens have a federal constitu-
tional right to vote for President and for members of the House
and Senate, and eliminating felony disenfranchisement;
• Changing the method by which redistricting occurs following
the decennial census (and reversing the Court’s decision in De-
partment of Commerce v. U.S. House of Representatives;14 and
• Instituting proportional representation and preferential voting.
PROPOSAL #1: SUPREME COURT SUPERMAJORITY VOTING
The number of justices serving on the Supreme Court is not fixed
by the Constitution.  The Judiciary Act of 1789 stipulated that “the
supreme court of the United States shall consist of a chief justice and
five associate justices . . . , any four of whom shall be a quorum . . . .”15
Not until after the Civil War was there something approaching a con-
sensus that the number of justices would be nine.16  The six-member
Court created by the first Congress had an interesting property: a sim-
ple majority and a two-thirds majority required the same number of
votes—four.17  If we extend the term “Framers” to the first Congresses
that engaged in what Ted Lowi terms “constitutive policy”—or estab-
lishment of the government and its organizational practices18—then
one must ask, what did Congress intend by the six-member Court?
That any judicial decisions considered by the Court be made by a sim-
13. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
14. 525 U.S. 326 (1999).
15. Judiciary Act of 1789 § 1, 1 Stat. 73, 73 (1789).
16. The Judiciary Act of 1869 fixed the number of Supreme Court justices at nine. THE
OXFORD COMPANION TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 477, 478 (Kermit L.
Hall ed., 1992).
17. Judiciary Act of 1789 § 1.
18. Theodore J. Lowi, Four Systems of Policy, Politics, and Choice, 32 PUBLIC ADMIN. REV.
298–310 (1972); see also Benjamin Ginsberg & Elizabeth Sanders, Theodore J. Lowi and Juridi-
cal Democracy, 23 POL. SCI. & POLS. 563, 564 (1990).
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ple majority or a supermajority?  I believe that the simple majority
vote is in no way sacrosanct, and can be replaced by a supermajority
voting requirement.
Congress has entertained multiple proposals for supermajority
voting on the Court.  Between 1918 and 1937, twenty-three bills pro-
posing some sort of supermajority were introduced in the House or
Senate.19  Most of these proposals came from progressives infuriated
by the Court’s pattern of striking down social and economic legisla-
tion during this period.20  While many were regular bills, some ad-
dressed the perceived problem by proposing constitutional
amendments.21
Several scholars have recently argued for a supermajority rule as
well.  Evan H. Caminker, a professor at the University of Michigan
School of Law, suggests that a supermajority requirement would move
the Court closer to a “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard for judi-
cial review, as opposed to a “preponderance of evidence” standard.22
Jed Shugerman, an assistant professor at Harvard Law School, pro-
poses that the Court can reclaim its historical commitment to defer-
ence and clarity either by adopting the two-thirds majority
requirement internally or through Congressional legislation.23  Max
Boot, Senior Fellow for National Security Studies at the Council on
Foreign Relations, asserts that a supermajority requirement also limits
the problem of “federal courts unfairly striking down state laws” by
removing the power of a Justice’s swing vote to decide the fate of con-
troversial legal issues.24
Those proposing either a bill or a constitutional amendment to
reform Supreme Court voting could choose to confine supermajority
voting to decisions involving constitutional interpretation, federal stat-
utes, and decisions of federal circuit courts, or could decide to extend
19. See Evan H. Caminker, Thayerian Deference to Congress and Supreme Court Supermajority
Rule: Lessons From the Past, 78 IND. L.J. 73, 117–22 (2003) (providing an appendix that cites
over sixty unique statutory and constitutional proposals from a wide variety of elected offi-
cials that would require the Supreme Court to make decisions via a supermajority).
20. Senator Borah, for instance, proposed in 1923 that the votes of seven of nine jus-
tices of the Court should be required to invalidate acts of Congress. LEROY ASHBY, THE
SPEARLESS LEADER: SENATOR BORAH AND THE PROGRESSIVE MOVEMENT IN THE 1920s, at 32
(1972).  See also WILLIAM G. ROSS, A MUTED FURY (1994), for a discussion on the hostility
of populists, progressives, and labor unions toward the Court.
21. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
22. See Caminker, supra note 19, at 98–101.
23. Jed Handelsman Shugerman, A Six Three Rule: Revising Consensus and Deference on the
Supreme Court, 37 GA. L. REV. 893, 894 (2002).
24. MAX BOOT, OUT OF ORDER: ARROGANCE, CORRUPTION, AND INCOMPETENCE ON THE
BENCH 207 (1998).
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the rule across the board.  The supermajority requirement could even
be restricted to Supreme Court decisions invalidating laws and actions
of the other federal branches.  It would be worth considering what
systematic patterns and effects, if any, there might be in Court re-
sponses to decisions by state high courts or federal circuit courts if
there were a supermajority voting requirement.  Any skew in out-
comes that depended on the appointment process to the federal
bench would surely vary over time.25
If we leave aside our knowledge and investment in particular prece-
dents and decisions that currently hang by the most slender of
threads, consider the consequences of the radical proposal to change
to a supermajority.  There are quite a few potential advantages.  For
Mark Tushnet and others who entertain the possibility of taking the
Constitution away from the Court,26 this reform would reduce the
number of cases that a closely divided Court could produce.  When
the Court writes a large number of 5-4 opinions, other branches of
government, states and state officials, and the attentive public are
more likely to see the Court as political and the outcomes as arbitrary,
thus undermining the prestige and authority of the Court.27  Under a
supermajority rule, the Court would simply not be able to issue opin-
ions if they could not marshal the votes.  Moreover, if we believe the
Court is inclined to judicialize some matters better left to political
branches, supermajority voting would reduce some of this activism.28
Would we want to require that a supermajority sign on to the
majority opinion, not just concur in the judgment?  This would dis-
please Cass Sunstein, who wants to give members room to concur on
results but differ on principles and reasons.29  The one advantage of
this even more radical idea is that fragmented decisions are not very
helpful to legislators and policy makers, or to lower courts.  However,
(a) it is highly useful to democratic deliberation to hear how different
25. As of September 2007, Republicans outnumber Democrats on the federal circuit
courts (ninety-six to sixty-six), and of the Republicans, seventy-three were appointed by
either former President Ronald Reagan or President George W. Bush.  Federal Judicial
Center, http://www.fjc.gov (follow “Federal judicial history” hyperlink; then follow “Judges
of the United States Courts” hyperlink; then follow “The Federal Judges Biographical
Database” hyperlink) (last visited Nov. 19, 2007).  The Federal Judicial Center website pro-
vides a search mechanism that categorizes judges by political affiliation and by the presi-
dent who nominated them.
26. MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS (1999).
27. Shugerman, supra note 23, at 896–97 (arguing that a two-thirds vote requirement
for the Court would increase its legitimacy).
28. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
29. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME 13–14 (1999).
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justices reason about the meaning of the Constitution,30 and (b) dif-
ferently reasoned concurrences and dissents may help generate
“nodes of conflict” for those outside the Court who are also engaged
in generating constitutional meaning.31  Therefore, I would not sign
on to this additional requirement.
A supermajority rule could affect the Court in a variety of ways.  It
is conceivable that a simple version of the supermajority rule could
lead to greater pressure for members of the Court to sign on or to
compromise.  Or, if the supermajority rule kept the Court from decid-
ing certain highly controversial issues, perhaps this would be accept-
able.  It is even thinkable that a Court producing fewer closely divided
opinions and a more stable body of precedent would be a less attrac-
tive target for activists of all stripes.  We might still find many decisions
wrong-headed, but we would likely have a Court not perceived as suffi-
ciently politicized to merit much public opposition.
Of course, under a supermajority scheme, individual presidents
would have less capacity to change the direction of the Court, and the
Court would be less responsive to shifts in majority preference in the
short run.  Because the average length of tenure of justices on the
Court has been rising,32 it may be sensible to couple this proposal with
the Carrington-Cramton proposal for limiting the Supreme Court ser-
vice of federal judges appointed for life.33
30. Mark Tushnet, Cass Sunstein, and others would like to see greater deliberation
about constitutional meaning in legislatures. See supra notes 3, 23, 24 and accompanying
text.
31. JULIE NOVKOV, CONSTITUTING WORKERS, PROTECTING WOMEN 16 (2001).  According
to Novkov, nodes of conflict are “moments in the development of doctrine during which
the various groups of actors who have access to the legal community struggle among them-
selves and with each other to establish their interpretations of a particular legal concept as
the dominant interpretation.” Id.
32. See Steven G. Calabresi & James Lindgren, Term Limits for the Supreme Court, 29
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 769, 775 (2006) (noting that the average tenure for justices rose
from 14.9 years during 1789–1970 to 26.1 years between 1970 and 2005). For Robert Dahl,
turnover of justices is an important factor keeping the Court from becoming counterma-
joritarian.  Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National
Policy-Maker, 6 J. PUB. L. 279, 284–85 (1957).  The rate of turnover, however, has declined
quite a bit since the time Dahl wrote, attenuating the link between the appointment pro-
cess and responsiveness to majority will.
33. Paul D. Carrington & Roger C. Cramton, The Supreme Court Renewal Act: A Return to
Basic Principles, in REFORMING THE COURT 467, 467–71 (Roger C. Cramton & Paul D. Car-
rington eds., 2006).  The consideration about responsiveness of the Court via the appoint-
ment process bears on this proposal, which was endorsed by (among many others) Bruce
A. Ackerman, Jack M. Balkin, Sanford Levinson, Lawrence H. Tribe, and Mark V. Tushnet.
See Roger C. Cramton & Paul D. Carrington, The Supreme Court Renewal Act (July 5, 2005),
available at http://paulcarrington.com/Supreme%20Court%20Renewal%20Act.htm (list-
ing scholars who endorse the Act “in principle”). This reform proposal could be consid-
ered alongside the supermajority voting proposal.
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PROPOSAL #2: KILL THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE
The individual citizen has no federal constitutional right to
vote for electors for the President of the United States unless
and until the state legislature chooses a statewide election as
the means to implement its power to appoint members of
the Electoral College.34
Levinson has already made clear the Byzantine nature of our sys-
tem for electing presidents.35  The Court in Bush v. Gore seems to have
determined that it was just too messy and problematic to leave the
2000 election to the House of Representatives, even though the Fram-
ers expected many presidents to be selected by the House under the
system ultimately adopted in Philadelphia.36  Here is certainly an
arena in which the Constitution has been informally amended.  As
Bush v. Gore makes clear, citizens have no constitutional right to vote
for electors for President of the United States unless their home state
legislature chooses to allow them to do so.37  South Carolina became
the last state to allow for direct popular election of electors, a change
made nearly a century and half ago.38  During the nineteenth century,
the move to allocate electors on a unitary basis statewide also gained
momentum—again, not constitutionally mandated.39  However, not
all states continued under the winner-take-all rule.  Maine and Ne-
braska allow electoral votes to be split at the congressional district
level.40  California also recently considered splitting its electoral
votes,41 as did Colorado.42  In 2007, Maryland became the first state to
34. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 104 (2000) (per curiam) (citing U.S. CONST. art. 11,
§ 1).
35. LEVINSON, supra note 7, at 81–2.
36. See John P. Roche, The Founding Fathers: A Reform Caucus in Action, 55 AM. POL. SCI.
REV. 799, 810–11 (1961), reprinted in PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF AMERICAN POLITICS 47, 63
(Samuel Kernell & Steven S. Smith eds., 2d ed. 2004) (noting that the Founding Fathers
assumed that the House of Representatives would choose many presidents because the
electors would fail to produce majorities after the Washington Presidency).  Based on this
historical information, one might ask: was Bush v. Gore yet another instance of the Court
privileging the power of the Executive over that of Congress?
37. Bush, 531 U.S. at 104.
38. Robert G. Dixon, Jr., Electoral College Procedure, 3 W. POL. Q. 214, 215 (1950).
39. By 1832, almost all states allocated their electors on a winner-take-all basis. See
DAHL, supra note 7, at 82; Matthew M. Hoffman, The Illegitimate President: Minority Vote Dilu-
tion and the Electoral College, 105 YALE L.J. 935, 946 (1996).
40. GEORGE C. EDWARDS III, WHY THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE IS BAD FOR AMERICA 10,
152–53 (2004).
41. See George Will, California Governor’s Veto Was Good for the Nation, CHI. SUN-TIMES,
Oct. 12, 2006, at 35 (arguing that the vetoed bill that would have changed the California
electoral college system to proportional voting was unconstitutional).
42. Colorado voters rejected the proposal in 2004.  Kirk Johnson, Electoral Vote Redistri-
bution Is Defeated, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 2004, at P9.
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sign an interstate compact that would obligate each state that signed
to cast all its electoral votes for the presidential candidate winning the
national popular vote.43  Consolidating electoral votes arguably gives
the state more clout; dividing them makes it somewhat less likely that
the electoral vote will diverge as much from the popular vote as it
currently can and does.  Tinkering with but retaining the Electoral
College would be a possibility.  However, we should eliminate it com-
pletely, and doing so has the potential to increase interest and turn-
out among voters.
The office of President of the United States has become far more
powerful at the outset of the twenty-first century than it was at the time
of the Founding.44  Someone this important and powerful who claims
to speak for and represent all the people should be elected by the peo-
ple.  If electors simply cast their votes mechanically according to the
popular vote of the state, they serve no positive purpose—it is simply a
ritual.  There are, of course, occasional faithless electors, and there is
no popular recourse for this problem.  More serious issues arise be-
cause (a) small states have a disproportionate share of votes in the
Electoral College, and (b) in close elections, the state’s entire slate of
electoral votes will generally be thrown to the presidential candidate
who gets a bare plurality of the popular vote.45  We need to amend the
Constitution to fix these problems.
This reform enhances democracy in more than one way.  Yes, it
allows the people’s voice better to prevail, favoring popular majorities
over states and allowing more votes to count.  However, it does more.
Political scientists know that citizens are more likely to take an interest
in elections and vote when there is an active campaign going on
where they live.46  Many states and congressional districts are currently
ignored by candidates, because they are sure to win or lose that
state.47  Swing, or battleground states, in which any candidate could
43. H.B. 148, 2007 Leg., 423rd Sess. (Md. 2007).  The bill’s changes do not take effect
until the signing states amount to 270 electoral votes. See also Editorial, Maryland Takes the
Lead, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 14, 2007, at A14.
44. There are curbs on the power claimed by the Bush Administration that we may
want to address separately, but I will not address them here.  The recent work of Kim Lane
Scheppele and collaboration by Sanford Levinson and Jack Balkin very effectively address
some of the post-9/11 themes. See generally Jack Balkin & Sanford Levinson, The Process of
Constitutional Change: From Partisan Entrenchment to the National Surveillance State, 75 FORD-
HAM L. REV. 489 (2006); Kim Lane Scheppele, Comment, Small Emergencies, 40 GA. L. REV.
835 (2006).
45. See EDWARDS, supra note 40, at 39; THOMAS E. PATTERSON, THE VANISHING VOTER
139–41 (2002).
46. See PATTERSON, supra note 45, at 142–44.
47. Id. at 141–42; DAHL, supra note 7, at 83.
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win, get a tremendous number of candidate visits, along with visits by
other national politicians and celebrity friends lobbying on behalf of
candidates.48  As such, a very select few states get an enormous infu-
sion of money, media buys, and candidates—causing the residents of
these states to be more politically involved in presidential elections.49
The timing of primaries privileges some voters even more in elec-
toral politics.  While residents of tiny New Hampshire, with four elec-
toral votes, have trouble counting the number of primary candidates
who visit their towns or living rooms, residents of some states have
rarely if ever been engaged in campaigns or courted.50  In those areas
where candidates are invisible, where no campaign advertisements
run, and where the election is remote, participation and electoral
turnout are both lower.51  When the potential electorate is mobilized,
their interest in issues and in politics is higher.52  The Electoral Col-
lege system demobilizes many potential voters because of the strategic
behavior of candidates.
One objection to the elimination of the Electoral College is that
in a strict popular vote system, candidates would concentrate on large
metropolitan areas, and that rural America would be neglected.53
With the current strength of organized Christian conservatives, and
the fact that most of the attention given to urban voters is by Demo-
crats,54 I doubt ex-urban and rural American voters would be ne-
glected anytime soon.  The current under-representation of urban
48. See LEVINSON, supra note 7, at 87–89; PATTERSON, supra note 4545, at 142–44. R
49. See LEVINSON, supra note 7, at 88; see also supra notes 46–48 and accompanying text.
50. See EDWARDS, supra note 40, at 103–14 (2004) (discussing how candidates’ visits and
advertising focus primarily on battleground states); supra notes 44–48 and accompanying
text.
51. See David Hill & Seth C. McKee, The Electoral College, Mobilization, and Turnout in the
2000 Presidential Election, 33 AM. POLS. RES. 700, 713–18 (2005) (finding a correlation be-
tween presidential candidate engagement and voter turnout); see also FAIRVOTE, THE
SHRINKING BATTLEGROUND: THE 2008 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS AND BEYOND 17 (2005),
http://fairvote.org/media/perp/Shrinking_Battleground_Final.pdf (urging a popular
election for the presidency because of the shrinking importance of many states in the
electoral process).
52. STEVEN J. ROSENSTONE & JOHN MARK HANSEN, MOBILIZATION, PARTICIPATION AND
DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA (2002).  Rosenstone and Hansen have richly demonstrated that
citizens participate in electoral activities when mobilized.  But often a deliberate decision is
made to not mobilize various groups of citizens. Id.
53. See Paul A. Rahe, Moderating the Political Impulse, in SECURING DEMOCRACY: WHY WE
HAVE AN ELECTORAL COLLEGE 55, 68–69 (Gary L. Gregg II ed., 2001) (arguing that candi-
dates for president would ignore less populous states under a direct vote system).
54. See Bruce E. Cain et al., From Equality to Fairness: The Path of Political Reform Since
Baker v. Carr, in PARTY LINES 6, 22–23, 26 (Thomas E. Mann & Bruce E. Cain eds., 2005)
(discussing how majority-minority districts are created through gerrymandering because
African Americans tend to align with Democrats).
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racial and ethnic groups in the census enumeration, and their conse-
quent under-representation in the apportionment of representatives,
builds in further disincentives to neglect ex-urban voters.  As Jack
Rakove argues, “[t]he logic of the current system encourages candi-
dates to focus on those issues and approaches that seem most likely to
sway undecided voters or mobilize loyalist turnout in the contested
jurisdictions.”55  Contemporary parties are unlikely to seek to mobilize
those who do not participate since these nonparticipants introduce a
great deal of uncertainty into election outcomes.56  If the Electoral
College vanishes, a vote would be a vote wherever it were cast through-
out the country.  Instead of the current system where candidates, par-
ties, and political action committees use negative advertising to try to
demobilize those relatively inattentive voters who might be persuaded
to stay home on election day and not vote for their opponent,57 and
devise strategies to put together winning coalitions of states,58 we
might see an attempt to actually turn out voters so long as the parties
are sufficiently competitive on the national level.
A historical argument for the popular vote is that the Framers
were not conscientiously attempting to create a presidential selection
method that provided additional protections for federalism.59  The
system for electing presidents was one of the last matters settled in
Philadelphia in the summer of 1787, having been referred to a Com-
mittee of Eleven at the end of August.60  There were many considera-
tions involved, including fatigue, when the final plan was reported on
September 6.61  The discussion on the presidential selection process
generally concerned how to select an executive not beholden to any
55. Jack N. Rakove, Presidential Selection: Electoral Fallacies, 119 POL. SCI. Q. 21, 36
(2004).
56. FRANCES FOX PIVEN & RICHARD A. CLOWARD, WHY AMERICANS DON’T VOTE 13–14
(1988).  Piven and Cloward argue that historic efforts by reformers in the Progressive Era
to demobilize African American and immigrant working-class voters in the late-nineteenth
and early-twentieth centuries shaped the character of nonvoting. Id. at 78–84.  See also
infra notes 76–80 and accompanying text for a discussion of felony disenfranchisement.
57. PATTERSON, supra note 45, at 50–52.
58. Id. at 141–42.
59. Most of the discussion among the delegates in the final days of the Philadelphia
Convention gravitated toward selection of electors by the national legislature, with some
sympathy for selection of the president by popular vote.  2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION OF 1787, at 493–94, 500 (Max Farrand ed., rev. vol. 1937) (1911) [hereinafter
THE RECORDS].
60. Id. at 473.  The committee was elected on August 31 to deal with sections of the
Constitution postponed or not acted upon. Id.  Mr. Brearley from the Committee of
Eleven reported out the Clause on Electors on September 4 and discussion continued over
the next several days. Id. at 496–98.
61. See EDWARDS, supra note 40, at 88–89.
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specific states or any particular constituency, which body would best
know the character of the candidates, how to create an executive de-
pendent only on the people, and how to avoid cabal and intrigue.62
The finalized system of electors seemed to be a compromise settled on
with little discussion; much more discussion was devoted to the
branch of the national legislature that would decide the election in
case a majority candidate did not emerge.63
Opponents of the plebiscitary presidency also bemoan the loss of
something important to constitutional design.  It has been argued that
“[i]f the states are removed from the presidential election system,
these unique and celebrated features of political locale will lose much
of their significance. . . . [because] [w]ith a national plebiscite, the
media mavens will not have to leave their offices in New York, Wash-
ington, or Los Angeles to run a presidential campaign.”64  However,
having worked with the Records of the Federal Convention of 1787 for
some years, I am convinced that the creation of an Electoral College
was nowhere near as clearly considered as were many other provisions
of the Constitution.  It resulted in part from fears that the populace
could not be trusted to make good decisions and would not know
candidates outside their own states or regions.65  As John Roche ar-
gues, the Framers were pragmatists and the Electoral College “was
merely a jerry-rigged improvisation which has subsequently been en-
dowed with a high theoretical content. . . .  The future was left to cope
with the problem of what to do with this Rube Goldberg mecha-
62. See THE RECORDS, supra note 59, at 499–502.
63. See supra notes 59–62 and accompanying text.  As George Edwards argues, “[m]ost
of the motivations behind the creation of the Electoral College are simply irrelevant today
and can be easily dismissed.” EDWARDS, supra note 40, at 89.  See also NEAL R. PEIRCE, THE
PEOPLE’S PRESIDENT 296–97 (1968), for a classic work calling for direct election of the presi-
dent to resolve problems with the Electoral College system.
64. Michael M. Uhlmann, Creating Constitutional Majorities: The Electoral College after
2000, in SECURING DEMOCRACY, supra note 52, at 103, 106–07.  A generation ago, Alexander
Bickel cautioned against a strict majoritarian premise and argued that the Electoral Col-
lege serves to make sure the president represents a diverse constituency. ALEXANDER M.
BICKEL, REFORM AND CONTINUITY 13–15 (1971).  Bickel felt that the “one-man, one-vote”
vision of the Court professed in reapportionment decisions should not prevail for presi-
dential elections. Id. at 14–15; see also JUDITH BEST, THE CASE AGAINST DIRECT ELECTION OF
THE PRESIDENT 146–48 (1975) (contending that the Electoral College system actually
strengthens the influence of urban issues and some minority groups such as Jews, African
Americans, and Catholics).
65. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 68 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1999)
(praising the presidential selection process because the election is ultimately decided by
thoughtful and deliberate electors and not the people).  Hamilton’s views that the people
would not have adequate knowledge of the potential candidates for president was also
reflected by some delegates as evidenced in THE RECORDS, supra note 59, at 499–500, 512,
514, including Delegates Mason, Sherman and Gerry.
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nism.”66  I believe that we have coped with this unnecessarily complex
and problematic system long enough, and should move to direct
voting.
PROPOSAL #3: CREATE AN INDIVIDUAL FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHT TO VOTE FOR PRESIDENT (AND SUPERVISE THE FEDERAL
ELECTION PROCESS)
It is essential that individual citizens have a federally recognized
right to vote for President of the United States, not just for members
of the Senate and House.  If such a right were recognized, the federal
government could assume greater responsibility for rules under which
votes in federal elections are counted and recounted; in making sure
there are numerous, well-advertised polling places; and that voting
equipment used in federal elections is adequately available and relia-
ble.  The federal government could eliminate injustices of previous
elections by holding accountable any state actors who suggest that
people with outstanding parking tickets might be arrested if they show
up at the polls, or state party activists who call black voters and tell
them, incorrectly and deliberately, that their polling place has been
moved.67  It would give the beleaguered and whittled-away Voting
Rights Act some new purchase.
While under Article I, Congress retains power to make or alter
the “Times, Places, and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and
Representatives” that are prescribed in each State,68 Congress has
been unwilling to make federal election processes and provisions uni-
form.  This is despite adequate constitutional authority to do so “ex-
cept as to the Places of chusing Senators.”69  Congress’s power to pre-
empt the states arguably extends to presidential elections, which take
place when all Representatives and at least some Senators are up for
election.70
We should move to take time, place, and manner power from the
states and place this among the powers of Congress in order to make
sure that the federal constitutional right to vote is equal, fair, and uni-
66. Roche, supra note 36, at 811.
67. Allegations of the former illegal acts came from voters in South Carolina in 2004,
and the latter from voters in New York and many other states in 2006.  National Campaign
for Fair Elections, Deceptive Practices and Voter Intimidation (2006), http://www.national
campaignforfairelections.org/page/-/Deceptive%20Practices%20Network%20Issue%20
Paper.pdf.
68. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4.
69. Id.
70. If doubt remains about the ability of Congress to pre-empt the states, an amend-
ment to eliminate the Electoral College would be helpful.
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form.  If we are going to do this via constitutional amendment, Con-
gress should be directed in clear language to exercise such power.  We
will then want federal rules governing voter registration that make vot-
ing easier, not harder.  We could make election days for federal offi-
cials national holidays or experiment with a multi-day election to
enhance participation.  We can assure that federal ballot access for
minor parties is not encumbered by creating rules governing nominat-
ing petitions.  As well, we could revisit the Court’s determination in
Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party that Minnesota’s ban on fusion
candidacies does not violate a party’s or a candidate’s constitutional
rights to free association under the First or Fourteenth
Amendments.71
This reform would also cut the legs from under the Anti-Federal-
ist argument advanced in U.S. Term Limits v. Thornton and assure that
the federal government has the capacity to determine the qualifica-
tions for an individual’s election to Congress.72  If others believe that
proposals to institutionalize term limits should come before a consti-
tutional convention as a means to enhance democracy, it is certainly
appropriate to have such a discussion.  I remain unconvinced.  Other
reforms might better curb the influence of lobbyists and campaign
contributions on legislation.73  Term limits just make more legislators
novices; they do not cause Congress as an institution to improve.74  A
constitutionally derived term limits amendment would, at least, put
citizens on a level playing field, which would not be the case if individ-
ual states were able to limit terms of federal officials.75
If there were a constitutionally recognized individual right to vote
for president, and if the right to vote for other federal officials was
guaranteed by robust federal protection in the ways I have suggested,
we could also stipulate an end to state practices of long-term felony
disenfranchisement.  It is not merely the case that convicted felons are
71. 520 U.S. 351, 369–70 (1997).
72. 514 U.S. 779, 787–98 (1995).
73. For an excellent examination of corporate influence issues, see R. Kenneth Godwin
& Barry J. Seldon, What Corporations Really Want from Government: The Public Provision of
Private Goods, in INTEREST GROUP POLITICS (Allan J. Cigler & Burdett A. Loomis eds., 6th ed.
2002).
74. See Thomas E. Mann, Congressional Term Limits: A Bad Idea Whose Time Should Never
Come, in THE POLITICS AND LAW OF TERM LIMITS  83, 84–88 (Edward H. Crane & Roger
Pilon eds., 1994); Nelson W. Polsby, Constitutional Mischief: What’s Wrong with Term Limita-
tions, AMERICAN PROSPECT, Nov. 30, 2002.
75. For a discussion of this representational dimension of U.S. Term Limits v. Thornton,
see Kathleen M. Sullivan, Dueling Sovereignties: U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 109
HARV. L. REV. 78 (1995); Neil M. Richards, Note, U.S. Term Limits v. Thornton and Compet-
ing Notions of Federalism, 12 J. L. & POL. 521 (1996).
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barred from voting in most states; in many of these states, those pa-
roled or on probation are still denied the right to vote, and in a signif-
icant number of states, ex-offenders are barred from voting for life.76
These measures disproportionately affect African-American males and
proliferated as ballot-restricting measures following the Civil War.77
This kind of civil death has additional demobilizing, depoliticizing
consequences for inner-city residents.78  Due to these adverse effects,
even if we cannot affect felon voting restrictions in state elections, we
can at least address voting in federal elections.  I believe that we can
overturn the Court’s Richardson v. Ramirez determination that lifetime
disenfranchisement of ex-felons poses no Fourteenth Amendment
Equal Protection difficulty,79 but this will probably require rewording
of Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment to deal with its specific
mention of “crime” as a reason for disenfranchisement.80
PROPOSAL #4: CHANGE REDISTRICTING METHODS AFTER THE DECENNIAL
CENSUS AND AMEND CENSUS PROCEDURES TO ALLOW STATISTICAL
SAMPLING
As currently practiced, partisan redistricting has a variety of
harmful consequences for democratic politics and processes.81  If we
retain present districting statutes (see Proposal #5 below), we need to
devise a different method for drawing district boundaries following
76. See THE SENTENCING PROJECT & HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, LOSING THE VOTE: THE IM-
PACT OF FELONY DISENFRANCHISEMENT LAWS IN THE UNITED STATES (1998), available at http:/
/hrw.org/reports98/vote (noting that, as of 1998, fourteen states barred ex-offender vot-
ing for life in many or all circumstances).  Maryland previously disenfranchised ex-felons
for life after two felony convictions, but changed the law in 2007 and restored voting rights
to ex-felons who have completed their sentences, including time on parole or probation.
See S.B. 488, 2007 Leg., 423rd Sess. (Md. 2007).
77. JEFF MANZA & CHRISTOPHER UGGEN, LOCKED OUT 41–45, 55–58 (2006).  See also
ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE 54–60 (2000), for a look at the growth of racial
exclusion from the ballot prior to the Civil War, and ELIZABETH A. HULL, THE DISEN-
FRANCHISEMENT OF EX-FELONS 16–17 (2006) for a review of the history of pre-Civil War
disenfranchisement measures affecting criminals.
78. See Todd R. Clear, The Problem with “Addition by Subtraction”: The Prison-Crime Relation-
ship in Low-Income Communities, in INVISIBLE PUNISHMENT 181, 181–82 (Marc Mauer & Meda
Chesney-Lind eds., 2002) (arguing that high incarceration rates in impoverished areas
destabilize community life and collective efficacy).
79. Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 54–56 (1974).
80. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2.
81. Some of these harms are congressional polarization and the creation of “safe seats”
wherein one party is virtually guaranteed that their candidate will win. See NOLAN MCCARTY
ET AL., POLARIZED AMERICA: THE DANCE OF IDEOLOGY AND UNEQUAL RICHES 59–66 (2006)
(noting that incumbents were all but invincible in the 2002 election); Norman Ornstein &
Barry McMillion, One Nation, Divisible, N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 2005, at A23 (commenting on
the substantial decline in centrist politicians from 1955 to 2004).
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the decennial census—one that removes the process from state legisla-
tive majorities or that eliminates many of the prerogatives they cur-
rently enjoy.
The Court considers that, in addition to factors such as compact-
ness and contiguity, partisan gerrymandering is a time-honored and
generally constitutional reason for drawing district lines for congres-
sional seats.82  There may be limits—non-retrogression, vote dilu-
tion—when the gerrymandering impacts minority voters,83 but these
impose rather modest constraints on legislatures.84  It is unlikely that
the Court will hold otherwise in the near future.  Four members of the
current Court appear to consider partisan gerrymandering a nonjusti-
ciable political question;85  Justice Kennedy, citing absence of rules
and precise rationale for correcting an established violation of the
Constitution in some redistricting cases, concurred in the judgment in
Vieth v. Jubelirer.86
Partisan gerrymandering generates safe legislative seats.  It also
imposes a great challenge on voters who want to evict incumbents or
change policy direction by changing their representatives.  Citizens
are less likely to vote, and those who are dissatisfied with the status
quo are more likely to feel alienated and disempowered if electoral
outcomes are predictable and relatively safe for the majority party in
state legislature.  Term limits amendment proposals seek to impose
82. See Nathaniel Persily, Forty Years of Political Thicket: Judicial Review of the Redistricting
Process Since Reynolds v. Sims, in PARTY LINES, supra note 54, at 67, 89 (concluding that
those proposing redistricting plans may legally base their decisions on partisanship); see
also Michael C. Dorf, The Supreme Court Gives Partisan Gerrymandering the Green Light—or at
Least a Yellow Light (May 12, 2004), http://writ.news.findlaw.com/dorf/20040512.html
(analyzing the Court’s rejection of a challenge to a politically gerrymandered district in
Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 (2004)).
83. See Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 143 (1986) (noting that political gerrymander-
ing cases may be brought under the Equal Protection Clause if the charging party makes a
threshold showing of discriminatory vote dilution).
84. See League of United Latin American Citizens v. Perry, No. 05-204, slip. op., 29–36
(U.S. 2006) (noting that incumbency protection can be a legitimate claim for congres-
sional redistricting).  Gary King believes that the Court may be increasingly receptive to a
measure of partisan symmetry as a standard by which to gauge the constitutionality of
partisan gerrymandering, since the Vieth majority held out some hope that partisan gerry-
mandering could be found unconstitutional under some circumstances if there were a
manageable standard, and three members of the LULAC v. Perry Court exhibited interest
in partisan symmetry. See Bernard Grofman & Gary King, The Future of Partisan Symmetry as
a Judicial Test for Partisan Gerrymandering after LULAC v. Perry, 6 ELECTION L.J. 2, 4 (2007).
85. See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 305–06 (2004) (Scalia, J., joined by Rehnquist,
C.J., and O’Connor & Thomas, JJ.) (concluding that political gerrymandering claims
under Article I and the Equal Protection Clause are nonjusticiable).
86. Id. at 306–07 (Kennedy, J., concurring).  Justice Kennedy cited a “lack of compre-
hensive and neutral principles for drawing electoral boundaries. . . . [and] the absence of
rules to limit and confine judicial intervention” in his opinion. Id.
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constraints on representatives that voters themselves cannot effect at
the ballot box, although partisan gerrymandering can still make it ex-
tremely difficult to change parties.  Parties protect their own power at
the expense of the electorate.87
Partisan gerrymandering has an insidious effect on Congress, and
on the policy-making process.  Keith T. Poole and Howard Rosenthal
have documented how much more polarized congressional voting is
now than at any time in the past century; when Congress was last this
polarized, American politics was at its most violent and unstable.88  Re-
search suggests that a polarized Congress pays less attention to poli-
cies that might narrow income disparities and less attention to social
welfare policy for all but the elderly.89  In fact, increases in polariza-
tion in different periods of American history correlate with increases
in economic inequality.90  Because other evidence suggests that when
Americans benefit from governmental social provision policies, they
are more likely to be invested in and participate in political and civic
life, the policy disinvestments we have seen since 1980 affecting all but
the elderly may be linked to a decline in civic engagement.91
According to students of congressional roll-call voting, party po-
larization in Congress appears to increase Congress’s propensity for
legislative gridlock and reduces its output of significant (as opposed to
trivial and narrow) legislation.  “Perhaps one of the most important
long-term consequences of the decline in legislative capacity caused
by polarization is that Congress’s power will decline relative to the
other branches of government.”92  It even seems plausible that per-
ceptions of Supreme Court activism may be rising because Congress is
doing less and even delegating enforcement power to courts, and that
such perceptions may therefore be integrally linked to what is going
on elsewhere in the federal government.  This is a question that stu-
dents of courts might well consider.
It will take some work to devise a good plan for how and by whom
district lines are to be drawn.  There are proposals for independent or
87. See PARTY LINES, supra note 54. But see Andrew Gelman & Gary King, Enhancing
Democracy through Legislative Redistricting, 88 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 541, 541–59 (1994) (arguing
that legislative redistricting benefits American democracy because it increases responsive-
ness and reduces partisan bias).
88. KEITH T. POOLE & HOWARD ROSENTHAL, CONGRESS: A POLITICAL-ECONOMIC HISTORY
OF ROLL CALL VOTING 229–32 (1997); Ornstein & McMillion, supra note 81.
89. See MCCARTY ET AL., supra note 81, at 184–86. R
90. Id. at 6–10.
91. See SUZANNE METTLER, SOLDIERS TO CITIZENS (2005) (discussing the high level of
civic involvement of veterans who benefited from the G.I. Bill).
92. MCCARTY ET AL., supra note 81, at 186.
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bipartisan state commissions to draw districts because they would os-
tensibly be less invested in protecting the seats of incumbents.93  Such
commissions would not be above politics, could be beholden to the
legislature, and would surely leave out the interests of third parties.
One proposal calls for a bipartisan commission to reject obviously un-
fair plans, fairness being defined by equal and neutral treatment of all
parties.94  One could end up with redistricting proposals reifying the
existing strength of the two major parties—better than what happens
now, but would this be the optimal system to choose?  If we retain
traditional single-member districts, we need to consider what consti-
tutes an appropriate congressional district: should it be heterogene-
ous or politically, economically, racially or ethnically more
homogeneous?  We may need another amendment to undo the
Court’s color-blindness jurisprudence going back to Richmond v.
Crosson.95
While on the subject of reapportionment, we should make sure
our reformed Constitution makes clear that an “actual
[e]numeration” of the population in the decennial census stipulated
in Article I, Section 2 does not preclude the use of statistical sam-
pling.96  The Census Act was amended by Congress in 1976 directing
that the Secretary of Commerce “in the year 1980 and every 10 years
thereafter, take a decennial census of population as of the first day of
April of such year, which date shall be known as the ‘decennial census
date,’ in such form and content as he may determine, including the
use of sampling procedures and special surveys.”97  In 1999, the Su-
preme Court in Department of Commerce v. U.S. House of Representatives
held that this Section was still limited by Title 13, Section 195 of the
United States Code, which states that “[e]xcept for the determination
of population for purposes of apportionment of Representatives in
Congress among the several States, the Secretary shall, if he considers
it feasible, authorize the use of the statistical method known as ‘sam-
pling’ in carrying out the provisions of this title.”98  Thus, O’Connor,
93. Samuel Issacharoff, Gerrymandering and Political Cartels, 116 HARV. L. REV. 593,
646–47 (2002); Ryan P. Bates, Note, Congressional Authority to Require State Adoption of Inde-
pendent Redistricting Commissions, 55 DUKE L.J. 333, 338 (2002).
94. Robert G. Dixon, Jr., Fair Criteria and Procedures for Establishing Legislative Districts, in
REPRESENTATION AND REDISTRICTING ISSUES 7, 10–11 (Bernard Grofman et al. eds., 1982).
95. Richmond v. J.A. Crosson, 488 U.S. 469, 509–11 (1989) (curtailing the power of
states to address a legacy of discrimination under a reading of the Fourteenth
Amendment).
96. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3.
97. 13 U.S.C. § 141(a) (2000).
98. See Dep’t of Commerce v. United States House of Representatives, 525 U.S. 316,
339, 343 (1999) (quoting the amended language of 13 U.S.C. § 195 (1994)).  Justice Ste-
\\server05\productn\M\MLR\67-1\MLR107.txt unknown Seq: 19 14-DEC-07 12:33
80 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 67:62
writing for the Court, decided that the Secretary of Commerce was
prohibited from using statistical sampling methods to determine pop-
ulation for the purpose of apportioning House districts.99  Obviously,
deference to administrative determination of procedures was not the
governing principle in this case.
Because members of the House of Representatives themselves
benefit from existing rules, they are unlikely to amend Section 195 of
the Census Act to eliminate what the Court sees as conflicting lan-
guage.  Even if Congress did act, the Supreme Court might then turn
to the Constitution itself and aver that the “actual [e]numeration” lan-
guage precludes statistical sampling.100  According to Justice Scalia, it
is “unquestionably doubtful whether the constitutional requirement
of an ‘actual Enumeration,’ Art. I, § 2, cl. 3, is satisfied by statistical
sampling.”101  Justice Scalia’s concurring opinion in Department of Com-
merce was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and by Justices Thomas
and Kennedy. If a future Court majority agreed with Justice Scalia’s
position, statistical sampling could only occur with a constitutional
amendment.
If some members of the Court are under the impression that a
headcount will be more reliable than sampling, they fail to under-
stand that a statistical sample controls for biases in a way that a
headcount does not.102  Moreover, the Court has permitted the Cen-
sus Bureau to use “hot-deck imputation” to fill in non-responses,103
which means that an assumption is made that a missing household is
identical to its closest neighbor.  Evidence does not indicate that hot-
deck imputation is any more reliable than sampling methods.  It is
more likely that the current majority simply thinks there are no consti-
tutional issues involved in undercounting and underrepresenting mi-
nority or urban residents for purposes of congressional redistricting
vens, joined by Justices Souter and Ginsburg, dissented and argued that the Census Act
required the Secretary of Commerce to use sampling in every situation, subject only to two
limitations: that the Secretary, in his discretion, may choose not to use sampling for appor-
tionment purposes and if he considers it unfeasible. Id. at 357–59 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
99. Id. at 343 (majority opinion).
100. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3.
101. Dep’t of Commerce, 525 U.S. at 346 (Scalia, J., concurring in part).
102. Justice Breyer seems to understand this.  In his opinion in Department of Commerce,
he pointed out that “unadjusted headcounts are also subject to error or bias—the very fact
that creates the need for a statistical supplement.” Id. at 316, 354 (Breyer, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
103. Utah v. Sec’y of Commerce, 536 U.S. 452, 457, 479 (2002).  The Court permitted
the technique because it found that imputation differs from sampling.
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following an “actual [e]numeration.”104  After all, as Justice Frank-
furter famously remarked, “there is not under our Constitution a judi-
cial remedy for every political mischief . . . .”105
However, census enumerations are high-stakes games, relevant
not only for legislative apportionment but for determining access to
federal revenues.106  A statistical sampling method can get the head
count done more accurately,107 and it is also potentially less costly.108
A reform is probably best accomplished here via constitutional
amendment.
PROPOSAL #5: MOVE TO PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION AND
PREFERENTIAL VOTING
While I am only able to touch superficially upon this final propo-
sal, I am quite certain that we would encourage political participation
in America by designing a better system of representation.  It makes
no sense that, with single-member districts, the Blue Party could re-
ceive 49% of the vote in every district, the Red Party receive 47% of
the vote in every district, and the Green Party receive 4% of the vote
in every district, and Congress would be 100% Blue Party.109  Our cur-
rent system does not adequately give voice to the distribution of pref-
erences in the nation.110  Minor parties have no chance of electoral
104. See Robert R. McCoy, Note, A Battle on Two Fronts: A Critique of Recent Supreme Court
Jurisprudence Establishing the Intent and Meaning of the Constitution’s Actual Enumeration Clause,
13 CORNELL J. LAW & PUB. POL’Y 637, 654–59 (2004) (discussing the Framers’ likely under-
standing of the phrase “actual enumeration”).
105. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 270 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
106. MARGO J. ANDERSON & STEPHEN E. FIENBERG, WHO COUNTS?: THE POLITICS OF CEN-
SUS-TAKING IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICA 1 (1999); see also Tom G. Palmer, Census 2000: You
May Already Be a Winner!, SLATE, Apr. 5, 2000, http://slate.com/default.aspx?id=78474 (ex-
plaining that the U.S. Census Bureau now tries to incentivize participation by explicitly
stating that access to government goods and services is determined by the forms);  United
States Census 2000, Flyer, Five BIG Reasons Why You Should Fill Out Your Census Form,
http://www.census.gov/dmd/www/pdf/d3236c.pdf.
107. Reply Brief for the Appellants at *1, United States Dept. of Commerce v. United
States House of Representatives, 525 U.S. 316 (1999) (No. 98-404), available at 1998 WL
801090. (“Based on abundant scientific evidence and the opinions of numerous experts
and panels, the Census Bureau has determined that the use of statistical sampling mecha-
nisms in the 2000 census will improve the accuracy of the state-level population counts that
will be used in apportioning Representatives among the States.”).
108. William M. Hunt, Dir. Fed. Mgmt Issues, Gen. Gov’t Div., Gov’t Accounting Office,
Testimony before the House Subcommittee on Census, Statistics, and Postal Personnel,
Decennial Census: Promising Proposals, Some Progress, but Challenges Remain (Jan. 26, 1994),
http://archive.gao.gov/t2pbat4/150852.pdf.
109. For a useful discussion of various voting methods and outcomes, see JACK H.
NAGEL, PARTICIPATION 100–08 (1987).
110. See LANI GUINIER, THE TYRANNY OF THE MAJORITY (1994) (discussing the problems
of our majority-rule system).
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success.  Lani Guinier makes the very appropriate point that if some
identifiable and intensely felt interests are unable to ever contemplate
winning a majority, they will feel disenfranchised because their voices
are absent in policy-making circles.111  She is, of course, talking about
race, but her argument could pertain to feminists, environmentalists,
or others.112  The issue is a sense of legitimacy and belief that one’s
voice matters in government.  There is also a good chance that if
more diverse values and voices are heard there will be new ideas in-
fused into politics.
When the Framers considered the importance of representing
place, they were fighting against taxation without representation, ar-
guing that the colonies could not be represented without a presence
in Parliament.113  They also thought in terms of interests divided by
state and region. The customs and values in their own states might not
be compatible with those in others, and potential new western states
might bring yet other interests to bear, upsetting a delicate balance
between coastal states and their already diverse interests, including
their interest in the use of slave labor.114  Geography is not the unify-
ing interest it once was.
Furthermore, there is no constitutional requirement for single-
member districts.  Many states used multi-member districts to elect the
first Congress.  Congress created the requirement for single-member
districts in the Apportionment Act of 1842, although a few states con-
tinued to elect representatives at-large following the legislation.115
Subsequent apportionment bills dropped, then re-added the single-
member district provisions.116  Not until 1967 did Congress prohibit
111. Id. at 9–10.
112. See id. at 19–20.
113. GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776–1787, at
173–81 (1998); see also Introduction to PAMPHLETS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 1750–1776,
at 93–96 (Bernard Bailyn ed., 1965).
114. See THE RECORDS, supra note 59, at 447–56 (debating the admission of new states to
the union); MARK A. GRABER, Dred Scott and the Problem of Constitutional Evil 91–96
(2006) (discussing the continual balancing of the interest of slave states and non-slave
states as the nation grew).
115. See Thomas E. Mann, Redistricting Reform: What is Desirable? Possible?, in PARTY LINES,
supra note 54, at 92, 95–96 (explaining that Congress first mandated single-member dis-
tricts in 1842, then effectively repealed the law in 1929, then enacted the current law re-
quiring single-member districts in 1967); ANDREW HACKER, CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICTING
48–49 (1964) (noting that in the 88th Congress, 17 of 435 Representatives were elected on
a statewide basis).
116. Voting Rights: Hearings before the H. Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional
Rights, 103d Cong. 2 (1994) (drawing of Thomas M. Durbin), reprinted in MARK
MONMONIER, BUSHMANDERS & BULLWINKLES 15 (2001) (illustrating the evolution of federal
redistricting standards); Mann, supra note 115; HACKER, supra note 115. But see Stephen
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at-large and multi-member elections for states with more than one
House seat, but by this point, only Hawaii and New Mexico were af-
fected.117  This legislation reflected concern, in the aftermath of pas-
sage of the 1965 Voting Rights Act, that at-large elections might dilute
black voting strength in southern states.118  There was an additional
concern, triggered by Court opinions in Baker v. Carr and Reynolds v.
Sims, that courts might compel states to hold at-large elections if they
were having trouble redistricting.119  While we must be mindful of
vote dilution problems if we change the current system, it is important
to emphasize that many aspects of the method of selection of Repre-
sentatives are not based on constitutional language or inference, but
rather on later statutory provisions.120
At a constitutional convention, we should discuss what kind of
system would better serve us.  Could we imagine municipal, regional,
or statewide multi-member House districts with citizens having the
same number of ballots as there are seats, and opportunities for bullet
or cumulative voting? Such systems have been used at the state and
municipal level.121  What about preferential voting—a modified Hare
system or a single transferable vote to minimize wasted votes?  If voters
had been able to rank preferences, many Nader voters might have
indicated Gore as a second choice in 2000, for example.  There would
be less disincentive to vote for a third party if the strategic voter did
not have to consider that her vote would likely lead to the election of
her least preferred candidate.122  Or, we could urge adoption of a
party-list proportional electoral system, with vote totals determining
Calabrese, An Explanation of the Continuing Federal Government Mandate of Single-Member Con-
gressional Districts, 130 PUB. CHOICE 23, 37–38 (2006) (arguing that the 1842 Act remains in
force today).
117. 2 U.S.C. § 2(c) (2000).  Senator Bayh of Indiana proposed exempting Hawaii and
New Mexico from the new legislation, but the version that passed, introduced by Senator
Howard Baker of Tennessee, provided no exemption. See 113 CONG. REC. 31718–20
(1967) (Senate debate); 113 CONG. REC. 34032–39 (1967) (House debate).
118. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
119. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 209–10 (1962) (holding that state voters’ claims that
redistricting violated their Equal Protection rights is justiciable); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S.
533, 586–87 (1964) (upholding the Alabama district court’s reapportionment of both
houses of the Alabama legislature); see also Branch v. Smith, 538 U.S. 254, 290 n.5 (Stevens,
J., concurring) (recounting the legislative history of 2 U.S.C. § 2a(c) (2000)).
120. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
121. See GUINIER, supra note 110, at 14–16 (discussing examples where alternate systems
such as cumulative voting have been used in American state and local politics); Note, Alter-
native Voting Systems as Remedies for Unlawful At-Large Systems, 92 YALE L. J. 144, 153–60
(1982) (arguing for a cumulative voting system).
122. A classic examination of strategic voting and the minimization of maximum regret
calculation (minimax regret) is John A. Ferejohn & Morris P. Fiorina, The Paradox of Not
Voting: A Decision Theoretic Analysis, 68 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 525 (1974).
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how many of the party’s candidates win. This would have the potential
virtue of not further undermining the role of parties in elections.
Many of these options have something to recommend them in
terms of enhancing the democratic process, improving representa-
tion, and making people feel they have more of a stake in electoral
outcomes.
CONCLUSION
Many other proposals could be advanced.  We should also think
carefully about provisions that would preserve rights, liberties, work-
place and environmental protections, and other values we have
worked hard to come by in an era of emerging global governance.
Despite our successes in the past 220 years, there are surely ways we
could form a better plan of union for a twenty-first-century nation.  I
believe the proposals I offer would help reinvigorate democracy and
enhance democratic processes, though my list is far from exclusive.
